# 1NC – Harvard/Amherst – R6 Harvard

# 1NC

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#### Interpretation: The resolution should define the division of ground- the role of the ballot is to determine the efficacy of a topical proposal relative to the status quo or a competing option.

#### The ‘United States federal government’ is the three branches.

U.S. Legal ’16 [U.S. Legal; 2016; Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access; U.S. Legal, “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition,” <https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/united-states-federal-government/>]

The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.

#### The resolution is a proposition of policy – “United States” and “should” prove

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Core antitrust laws refer to statutory laws – the increased prohibitions must be reflected IN Clayton, Sherman and FTC

Kuntz 2-23-21

(Kendall. MARYLAND CAREY SCHOOL OF LAW. Can the Courts and New Antitrust Laws Break Up Big Tech? https://www.law.umaryland.edu/Programs-and-Impact/Business-Law/JBTLOnline/Break-Up-Big-Tech/)

There are three core antitrust laws in effect today: the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. These three antitrust laws attempt to protect market competition for the benefit of consumers. The Sherman Act outlaws monopolies and contracts that unreasonably restrain trade. The Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions that substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. Lastly, the Federal Trade Commission Act bans “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” Antitrust laws are not established to punish success, but are focused on preventing anticompetitive effects, exclusionary practices, reduced consumer choice, and hindered innovation.

#### C. Two impacts:

#### 1. Clash: Debate requires negation- affirmatives that don’t address the resolution makes irrative clash impossible because shifting away from the resolutional agent and mechanism kills negative ground by making it concessionary and allows for aff conditionality which cements the structural advantages of the affirmative through crushing limits.

#### 2. Fairness- debates about scholarship in a vacuum are myopic and breed reactionary generics – they allow the aff to cement their infinite prep advantage, because all the aff has to do is find evidence supporting an ideological orientation towards the world – this crushes clash because all of our prepared negative strategies are based on praxis, and by not defending a clear actor and mechanism we lose 90% of negative ground, and the aff still retains traditional competition standards like perms to make being neg impossible

### 1NC

Striketober CP

#### CP Text: Debate labor should organize and advocate for a general strike and debate stoppage until the governing bodies of the collegiate debate organizations agree to accommodate hybrid teams

#### Solves the affirmative - General strikes are historically successful and produce meaningful social change

Kelly 1-24-19 (Kim. Freelance journalist and organizer based in Philadelphia. Her work on labor, class, politics, and culture has appeared in the New Republic, the Washington Post, the Baffler, and Esquire, among other publications, and she is the author of FIGHT LIKE HELL, a forthcoming book of intersectional labor history. Teen Vogue. Everything You Need to Know About General Strikes. https://www.teenvogue.com/story/general-strikes-explained)

“Historically speaking, the general strike is incredibly successful since it completely shuts down the functions of the economy,” author and union organizer Shane Burley tells Teen Vogue. “This is really the foundation of the power workers have under capitalism, to withhold their labor and undermine capital. Because a general strike affects the economy so broadly, it gives workers a huge bargaining chip to make massive societal demands — not just in one workplace, but of capital across all sectors.”

As noted by Black liberation and socialist author W.E.B. Du Bois, one of the country’s most successful general strikes happened during the Civil War, when roughly half a million enslaved Africans escaped Southern plantations and found the Union Army, and mass numbers of poor white Confederates deserted their posts — two independent collective actions that, together, helped kneecap the Confederacy.

More recently, a general strike in India saw 150 million workers across various industries demanding higher wages and union protections in what may well be history’s largest general strike. In 2006, janitors in Houston made waves with a nine-week strike that piggybacked on a wave of wildcat strikes and school walkouts in response to H.R. 4437, a bill that sought to criminalize both undocumented people and anyone who offered them aid (the legislation ultimately failed).

“To this day, the idea of a mass or general strike remains both an ideal and a tactic that can be picked up by everyday people if and when they discover the power to do so,” Andrew O'Conner, an editor at It's Going Down, an anarchist news and podcast platform, tells Teen Vogue. “And as American history has shown, this tactic is one that has been used by the working class as a whole, across lines of color, gender, trade, and geography.”

Organizers stress the importance of first building mutual aid networks and strong community systems to care for people in the event of a mass labor action like a general strike, before asking people to hit the streets. It’s hard enough to go out on a planned strike during union contract negotiations (and the Trump-controlled National Labor Relations Board is trying to make it harder). In those cases, workers at least have the support of their union, and, hopefully, a strike fund to help cover bills.

The resources and infrastructure needed to adequately care for those participating in a general strike are impossible to calculate. In addition, the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act (which was passed in the wake of the women-led 1946 Oakland general strike) outlawed actions taken by unionized workers in support of workers at other companies, effectively rendering both solidarity actions and the general strike itself illegal.

Elana Levin, a former union organizer who teaches digital strategy as program director for New Media Mentors and is a co-founder of Organizing 2.0, tells Teen Vogue that “striking means not asking permission” in the first place. She’s excited about the interest she’s seen in the idea of a general strike, but warns that hastily planned action could end up harming more than it helps.

“If you are asking someone to strike, you have to be able to help them answer the question of how will you help them survive if they do. It’s a question that has been asked and answered before, but it is a serious thing,” she says. “In reality, general strikes are generally lead by the most marginalized groups, because it is a way to wield power.”

O’Conner says self-organization is one of the most useful building blocks of any major worker action, and adds that it's important to break down barriers between striker and supporter to craft a more cohesive, purpose-driven community based on class solidarity.

“As we saw with the current mass teachers strikes, which can be seen as literal general strikes across trade lines, collective and communal mutual aid and support from both picketers and community members, like schoolchildren, is key,” O’Conner says. “In some instances, workers also choose to strike by offering services for free: For instance, during many transit strikes and job actions, bus drivers and transit operators will refuse to collect money. We see many of these experiments playing out now with the shutdown, from mass sickout strikes to services being offered for out-of-work employees.”

An organizer with the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), who chose to remain anonymous for this story, tells Teen Vogue that one of the keys to unlocking those levels of support also lies in good old-fashioned community organizing and remembering how difficult it can be for people to take that step toward the picket line, because of familial obligations or existing financial hardship.

“The way to actually figure this out is to do the work of labor and community organizing — that is, actually asking your coworkers and your neighbors about the material issues that affect them, how you can address those issues collectively, and, if they think a general strike could work, what they would need to take that step,” they said. “Maybe it's child care? Maybe it's a hardship fund to cover lost wages? Maybe it's just the support of the community? With the current government shutdown threatening to starve the poor through lack of SNAP funding and various bodies of federal workers already furloughed, we could be entering the kind of crisis that makes a general strike possible.”

So, is it time for a general strike? We clearly have a whole lot to do before anyone goes calling for mass action, but activists around the U.S. are already hard at work on these kinds of mutual aid projects and community outreach efforts. We may not be ready yet, but the groundwork is already being laid. As bad as things are now, oppressed workers in the past have fought against even more daunting odds to take their power back … and if things get gnarly enough, it may happen again.

### 1NC

E-Prime

#### We demand that the debate community adapt to accommodate hybrid debaters.

#### The affirmatives reliance on “to be” language dooms their advocacy to serial policy failure

Bourland 89 [D. David, Prof of Linguistics, “To Be or not to Be: E-Prime as a Tool for Critical Thinking,” Etc. 46.3]

In the years immediately following World War I, Alfred Korzybski observed the stark differences between the consequences of engineering and scientific activity and the fruits of political activity. He pointed out that, when engineers build a bridge it normally functions as designed. But when politicians "build" a treaty or government, it usually collapses amid great human suffering. Korzybski's analysis led him to conclude that the fundamental factor responsible for that discrepancy in performance consists of the structure of the languages used by those who design bridges and those who design governments. The engineers and scientists use a language (mathematics) which has a structure similar to that of the bridges, hence the language produces predictability. However, the politicians normally employ a language of archaic structure that uses static terminology in describing dynamic human socioeconomic issues. As Korzybski pointed out, to the extent that a treaty, constitution, etc., incorporates this kind of static-dynamic discrepancy, one may expect undesirable and unstable consequences. To put this somewhat differently, Korzybski asserted in his books that dynamic social institutions, if based upon static premises, must ultimately collapse. And if we inquire into this matter semantically, we find that the use of the verb "to be" constitutes the main source of static premises and assertions in ordinary English.

## Case

### 1NC

#### Vote neg on presumption. No risk of solvency – debate is structurally incapable of actualizing their method

**Ritter 13** – received his law degree (J.D.) from the University of Texas School of Law, with honors, in 2010, and his B.A. from Trinity University, cum laude, in 2007.   
(Michael J Ritter, September 2013, National Journal of Speech & Debate, Volume II Issue I, “Overcoming the Fiction of ‘Social Change Through Debate’: What’s To Learn From 2PAC’s *Changes*”, Pages 19-38)//DZ

Introduction In his immortal Changes, the supposedly late Tupac (2PAC) Shakur lamented, “I see no changes.” 2PAC expresses in Changes both his frustration with social racism and his hope for change. Acknowledging that race-based social inequalities would likely never completely disappear, he provocatively presented a model for improved communication and understanding to minimize racial inequalities. In 1999, Changes was released, topped international charts, and for many years thereafter, impressed a global audience (including The Vatican). Many students who participate in competitive interscholastic debate in high school and college frequently argue during debates that their speech acts, performances, or presentations criticizing a particular concept in a debate round could, just like 2PAC’s Changes, actually affect social inequities or issues inside and outside of the debate community. To preserve the activity, coaches and judges should discourage debaters from attempting to use—or deceiving others that they are using—competitive interscholastic debate to create social change. Those in the debate community who believe (or argue) that competitive interscholastic debate can reach an audience beyond the debate room, and their opponents, coaches, and judges, should consider this question: “What can I learn from 2PAC’s success in communicating his message in Changes?” Those who have wed themselves to the fiction that in-round speech acts in a competitive interscholastic debate setting can and does create actual social change (due to either some strategic reasoning or simple denial) will have a difficult time reaching the honest answer to that question: “I am wrong.” The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually incapable of creating any social change, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with nonapplicable rhetorical theory that fails to account for the unique aspects of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: “Can debate cause social change?” Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen not to prove this fundamental assumption, which—as this article argues—is merely a fiction that is harmful in most, if not all, respects. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterized as a fiction than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is not provable by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be incredibly critical of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes. Competitive Interscholastic Debate: The Break Down Competitive interscholastic debate is uniquely different from other types of persuasive activities. Each individual component of the term “competitive interscholastic debate” describes the essential structures of the activity from which very important precepts can be discerned. These precepts are fundamental to any application of any rhetorical theory regarding speech acts within a debate round because the precepts necessarily affect the scope of two crucial aspects of all communication: audience and purpose. The debate community’s members, many of whom are shorthand enthusiasts, simply refer to the activity as “debate.” But what that simple term omits, and what many frequently forget when uncritically accepting the “social change through debate” fiction, is any reference to the essential structures from which the community spawned: a competition of argumentation during which students from one school compete against students from other schools for the votes of judges. Therefore, before any plausible argument can be made concerning the purposes or benefits of debate, the assumptions upon which those arguments are based must be identified and explained. The following discussion (perhaps painstakingly) analyzes the essential components of competitive interscholastic debate to identify the essential precepts that debunk the assumptions relied upon by those endorsing the fiction that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change. “Debate” “Debate,” in its simplest and most basic form, is the presentation of seemingly inconsistent positions to convince an audience. A position could be a factual or empirical position that describes current or historical fact (e.g. A = B). The presentation of a seemingly inconsistent position to convince an audience (e.g. A ≠ B) would constitute an empirical debate about what facts are (or were) true or false (or neither). A position could also be a normative position (i.e. a position about how the way things should have been or should be (e.g. “A should not have been or should be A). The presentation of inconsistent normative positions to convince an audience (e.g. A should not or should be A) constitutes a normative debate. The intent-to-convince element is an indispensible part of any debate. Presenting apparently conflicting positions with the intent to convince requires an audience of some sort, as an audience is necessary for someone to be convinced. For instance, if a person writes an article on the propriety of the verdict in the Trayvon Martin trial to convince others that the verdict was wrong, but then no one reads it, there is no consideration of the position by the intended audience because no one (other than the author himself) could be persuaded. An audience can be as simple as a single person (e.g. having an internal debate with oneself to consider the validity of two seemingly inconsistent positions). An audience could constitute only one person when someone presents two seemingly inconsistent positions for that one-person audience to consider (e.g. an attorney advising his client that he has two options and presents the pros and cons of both for his client to make a decision). Two people could comprise an audience. For example, a debate could involve two people who present apparently inconsistent positions to try to convince each other of the rightness of their respective positions. A seeming or apparent inconsistency between positions is also a necessary component of a debate. If two positions are clearly consistent, then there is no debate. Conversely, an actual inconsistency is not necessary for a debate. The following hypothetical demonstrates why an actual inconsistency is not required for a debate: Two debaters go on a date appear to disagree over which movie, Django Unchained or Kill Bill, to see at Quinton Tarantino’s privately owned theater on Friday night at 10 p.m. This appears to be a conflict because the two cannot watch both in different theaters together at the same time. Both of them want to see the most violent Tarantino movie with a revenge theme at that time. During the exchange their arguments for why Django Unchained or Kill Bill is more violent, one debater mentions Inglorious Bastards and both agree that Inglorious Bastards is the most violent Tarantino movie with a revenge theme. Fortunately, Inglorious Bastards is also playing at the theater at the same time. Just because the two debaters did not decide between Kill Bill and Django Unchained does not mean that they did not have a debate. During their debate, they realized that their apparently conflicting positions were not actually conflicting; they had the same position—wanting to see the most violent Tarantino revenge movie. And in this example, neither audience member was convinced of either initial position. Therefore, in any “debate” there will be some audience that must resolve an apparent conflict of positions. In all communications, there is some audience. Sometimes the audience has a specific goal, such as being entertained, informed, or persuaded. The discussion about what debate “is” demonstrates that identifying the audience is essential to understanding how the context of a speech act can advance or hinder the speaker’s goals. A Competitive Activity A second component of competitive interscholastic debate is that it necessarily involves a competition. Not all debates must occur within the context of a competition, as the Tarantino example above suggests. But most—if not all— debates in the debate community occur either to win a debate round at a debate tournament or in preparation for winning a debate round at a debate tournament. The tournament structure is a sin qua non (a fundamental component) of the debate community. And in the very rare case that debaters host a public debate (and in the very fortunate case that an audience attends and does not leave during the first speech), the purpose is ordinarily not to convince the audience of a particular side, but to demonstrate what the school’s debate team does. At a typical tournament, there are a pre-determined number of preliminary rounds in which all entered schools’ debaters compete against debaters from other schools that have entered the tournament. The tournament usually determines beforehand the number of debaters that will advance to elimination rounds, and that number usually equals four to thirty-two teams divided into brackets (semifinals to double octafinals). If a team loses an elimination round, as the term suggests, then they are eliminated from the tournament. The prevailing team advances further into the tournament until the “winner” is left with no competitor. A hypothetically neutral critic will be assigned as a “judge.” The judge, or a panel of an odd number of judges, will vote for the debaters who they believe won the debate by doing [did] “the better debating.” Many judges have written paradigms; and the vast majority of written paradigms express a preference for how the debate should occur, but express little or no concern about what (in terms of content) is argued. In almost all debate rounds, the judge will make his decision based on how the debate occurs, not based on what persuaded the judge. A primary (and probably the best) example of this point is a “dropped” argument. Many debate rounds are won, not on the basis of the persuasiveness of an argument, but because the opponents failed to directly respond to the argument. Judges will ordinarily permit the opponent to then “blow up the impact” of this drop in the following speech. Thus, the competitive nature of debate causes, to a great degree, the how to precede the what (unless the point is immaterial or nonessential). As a result, many judges divorce their human experiences and logical reasoning skills of objectively evaluating the persuasiveness of an argument from the decision of which team to vote for. And even when there is a “point-for-point and warrant-for-warrant” debate, many judges will vote based on who does the better job (technically speaking) extending and explaining the argument (even if the argument is atrociously absurd). The target audience is solely the judge, and the sole issue the judge must decide is which side “did the better debating.” Mandatory switch-side debating confirms that the debaters themselves are not the audience for persuasion is mandatory switch-side debating. And because fair opportunity is valued when there are winners and losers in competitions, most judges approach their paradigms with an attempt to be objective. Tournaments hire judges to objectively evaluate debates based on direct language from the ballot, the ballot the judge must sign his or her name to: who did the “better debating” or who “won the round” (which is a rephrasing of who did the better debating). Competitive debate is a very narrow slice of “debate.” One could persuasively argue that competitive debate barely qualifies as “debate” because the target audience (the judge) is persuaded not by the truth of an argument, but who “does the better debating.” Hence, the only point on which the judge of a competitive debate is seeking to be persuaded of is who to vote for. This conclusion narrows the previous section’s conclusions regarding “debate” (generally) because the “competition” element narrows the audience in the debate to the judge, not the competitors. The debaters are not competing to be persuaded. They are competing to persuade. And the only issue on which the audience—the judge—is asked to resolve is which competitors did the better debating. The judges are not present to objectively evaluate the content of messages and arguments for their persuasive value outside of the narrow issue of who did the better debating. An Interscholastic Activity The final essential component of competitive interscholastic debate is that students from different schools compete at debate tournaments. Many academics who have spent decades competing in and coaching debate have probably never encountered an intrascholastic debate competition, at least not in any of the formats in the debate community. The interscholastic element further narrows “competitive debate” to a student activity that faces resource constraint (e.g. time, budget, rooms available, etc.). Perhaps, noting that the competitive debates are interscholastic highlights the more important point about what competitive student debate is not: “academic debate” or “public debate.” The interscholastic element determines how the competitive debates take place. Generally, several factors constrain interest in and participation on a school’s debate team. First, a school likely could not afford to send every enrolled student to travel to and register in debate tournaments. Even if some schools could afford this, not all could. But even the possibility of all schools’ students would be problematic in terms of one school making up more than half of the field. And even if all schools could afford to send all students to a debate competition, debate tournaments likely could not occur (perhaps, only during the summer) because debate tournaments would last several weeks. The tournament structure means that only a select few will be included in the first place to compete, and as tournaments progress, more and more debaters are excluded. Because only a limited number of teams can be sent to tournaments, coaches must decide who “makes the team” and which teams go to what tournaments. But these decisions (while they could be made for a good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all) will likely be influenced by a student’s natural ability or potential to become skilled at how to do our community’s particular formats of competitive debate. And because teams generally can and do not compete against other teams from their schools, a competitive interscholastic debate will result in one school advancing over the other whose chances of advancing then diminish if not disappear. Finally, the interscholastic nature of competitive interscholastic debate is a point of differentiation from other types of competitive debates: the debaters are all students from different schools. They are either in college or high school. This distinguishes competitive interscholastic debate from other types of debate— particularly academic debate. High schoolers are generally still developing physically and mentally, as well as start developing intellectually. Most college students continue their intellectual development as they obtain their associate’s or bachelor’s degrees. It is not until students begin studying for a master’s, law, or doctorate degree that they must study a particular field in depth, reading publications from academics in their respective fields. Many former competitive interscholastic debaters must, for the first time, become familiar with the academics in the particular field for the sole purpose of learning, not “cutting cards” for debate. It is at the end of a master’s studies or PhD program that students finally must contribute something novel within their particular field of study that contributes something to that field of study. This is the point at which students have made an academic contribution (assuming that what is written is selected for publication). Thus, competitive interscholastic debate is radically different from every other kind of debate. It is not “academic debate,” and it is not “public debate.” Because schools’ resources limit debate participation, it is necessarily an exclusive activity to which no students have the right to participate in. And without accounting for how the structures unique to competitive interscholastic debate—exclusion, competition, a limited audience, very narrow audience purpose, etc.—affect the application of a general communications or rhetorical theory in this specific context, the application should be reconsidered or viewed highly skeptically if not outright rejected. Let’s Talk 2PAC To illustrate many of the reasons why “social change through debate” is a fiction, consider the question posed in the introduction: “How did 2PAC’s Changes reach a substantial and diverse cross-section of a global audience?” Any reader who picked up on the humor of the “supposedly-late” descriptor above would immediately know that it is a trick question: 2PAC didn’t make any impression by releasing Changes in 1999; 2PAC died in 1996. 2PAC’s estate contracted with players in the music industry to produce Changes by splicing together several of 2PAC’s pre-death recordings, and released Changes in 1999. The song was advertised and played on the radio and CD players internationally. The similarities and differences between 2PAC when recording Changes and a student arguing that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change are informative. Although 2PAC wrote and recorded parts of Changes, several other individuals in a very complex series of transactions and communications were responsible for the song’s global successes. When 2PAC recorded the various parts of Changes, he merely spoke and sang words into a microphone in an Interscope Records studio where the audience was solely concerned with operating equipment for quality assurance purposes. Similarly, a debater who is asserting that debate can cause social change, like 2PAC in Interscope Records’ recording studio, is speaking to an audience who typically cares little (if at all) about the debater’s intended message and cares about recording it “on the flow.” But unlike 2PAC’s audience (the recording studio that likely had solely a financial interest in re-communicating 2PAC’s message), the judge generally does not re-communicate the debater’s message for any persuasive purpose, and the judge usually has little or no interest or incentive to do so. Changes’s commercial context is part of what allowed the song to spread worldwide. Those initially re-communicating 2PAC’s message did so for financial reasons; the fact that 2PAC’s message was concerned with minimizing racial inequalities likely contributed only a limited extent to the song’s success. Pys’s Gangnam Style had similar success at reaching a global audience, and it made fun of Korean culture. What Changes, Gangnam Style (both messages disseminated in a commercial context), and debate (a competitive activity and, yet ironically, one increasingly marked by anti-capitalist sentiments) have in common is that form is so much more important than substance. But the difference between the form of international hit songs and debate is that the form of musical productions—with a catchy tune, visually stimulating music video, and sometimes a valuable message—makes the message appealing to a general audience. The form of modern competitive interscholastic debate—with, at its worse, rapid fire spreading of dense philosophical verbiage or personal attacks tangentially related (at best) to the topic—is simply unappealing to a general audience. If anything, the form in which messages are communicated in competitive interscholastic debate repels audiences outside of the community. To the extent that Changes was made more popular by its message, the crucial difference between the message of Changes and messages communicated in a debate round is that the in original production of Changes, and the recommunication of that original message, the message has never changed (save some remixes) or contradicted itself. The original version of Changes was the same as it was when it was released until (and after) the time that it made the Pope’s playlist. Conversely, debaters who communicate messages in a debate round will, almost always, contradict their argument (again for persuasive reasons, not because they were convinced that they were wrong initially) in another round, read a different part of the card they were reading previously, reading different phrasings of the same argument by a different author, etc. Therefore, the message-repetition element is missing from competitive interscholastic debate. The multiple points of distinction between 2PAC’s Changes and messages made in debate rounds demonstrate why the dissemination of messages outside of a debate round for persuasive purposes is highly unlikely. The Kicker As the question, “How did 2PAC reach a substantial and diverse cross-section of that global audience?” was trick question, so (to some extent) was this article’s initial question: “What can I learn from 2PAC’s success in communicating his message in Changes?” While one lesson we can learn from the success 2PAC’s changes concerns the factors that make messages more likely to be disseminated worldwide, there is pretty much nothing else to learn in terms of persuasion in the context of competitive interscholastic debate. Up to this point, this article has shown how each of the essential components of “competitive interscholastic debate” makes it very different from any other kind of debate. But one thing that is persuasive in any kind of debate is some sort of properly conducted study (or even a mere survey) that provides empirical proof or even substantial anecdotal support. To date, none of the many academics who coach or participate in the debate community have published a study or survey to support the social change fiction. (Perhaps they have tried, and discovered they were just wrong.) But until such an empirical study of competitive interscholastic debate is conducted, students, judges, and coaches should not take it for granted. Similarly, no one has studied whether 2PAC’s Changes had any effect on people’s attitudes toward racial equality. (Thus, it would be equally supported to say that 2PAC’s Changes increased racial violence.) No survey or statistical studies have been conducted, constrained by academic standards, and then published, that suggest that 2PAC’s Changes had any real effect on anyone (other than the objectively measurable effect that purchasing the song had on the buyer’s wallet). Similarly, no one has studied whether any individual debate round, a team’s year-long “project,” or a debate team’s seemingly perpetual social campaign has created any social change regarding the position they support. While it is theoretically possible that someone has listened to 2PAC and thought to himself, “Hmm, perhaps I should not be so racist,” it is as equally possible that, according to the arguments of Judith Butler or Jacques Derrida (or insert any other philosophy academic or rhetorical theorist—from Aristotle to Slavoj Žižek—here), debate has created some sort of social change. The problem is that nothing supports that debate rounds can create social change other than the adage, “Anything is possible.” The reasoning that debate can create social change is circular at its best. The absurdity is that judges prefer specific, predictive, and empirical evidence over general theoretical possibilities in almost every single context except when it comes to attempts to use debate to create social change. Bald theoretical assertions with flowery language from philosophers are accepted over uncarded but logical analytical arguments. Any explanation for why coaches and students (at least pretend to) believe that debate can create social change would require an unacceptable degree of speculation. The bottom line is that the proposition that competitive interscholastic debate will (or more accurately, can) result in social change is merely speculation without any logical or empirical support. Overcoming the Fiction Merely labeling a proposition a fiction is insufficient to merit the proposition’s abandonment. This article uses the term “fiction” because the idea that debate rounds could likely create any social change is, in all meanings of the term, is a fiction. A fiction is a conclusion that is feigned, invented, or imagined. It is an imaginary thing or event, postulated for the purposes of argument or explanation. One can distinguish a fiction from a statement of fact (which can be determined true or false) or a scientific hypothesis (a falsifiable theory answering a posed question). A fiction, on the other hand, is something that is either false or has not been attempted to be proven true. A fiction is neither inherently good nor inherently bad. Rather, it is a tool to achieve some other purpose. Fictional stories frequently convey a moral to be extracted or lesson to be learned. In law, a legal fiction is a legal rule that is known to be factually false (such as the legal fiction that all people are presumed to know the law) that is endorsed for some greater public policy purpose (such as to avoid ignorance and discourage intentionally avoiding knowledge of the law). After identifying whether a proposition is a fiction (or a truth or hypothesis), determining whether the fiction is worthwhile requires weighing the pros and cons of the fiction against the purposes of the context in which it is used. The Fiction The idea or proposition that competitive interscholastic debate can result in social change is properly characterized as a fiction because it is false and has not been proven true. The proposition that debate rounds can create social change is a fiction because it is false on a theoretical level. Those who attempt to apply theories about academic debate (i.e. arguments published in books and journals by PhDs who argue about concepts within their respective fields of study), social movements, rhetorical acts, and performances are not discussing competitive interscholastic debate. Philosophers and rhetorical theorists have never written an article or book using competitive interscholastic debate as an example of their theory or position. Their theories draw upon historical (i.e. anecdotal) examples to demonstrate their theories. None of them have ever cited a debate round or “debate movement” as an example of their theories. Those who attempt to apply academic theories to competitive interscholastic debate (primarily communications academics, who also frequently happen to be participants in the debate community), decontextualize the broader theories to apply them to competitive interscholastic debate without adequately accounting for the competitive and interscholastic structures of competitive interscholastic debate. Although some “competition” is part of any debate, this part is more accurately described as the presence of seemingly conflicting positions, which is discussed above and exemplified by the Tarantino hypothetical. In social movements or public debate, there are two (or more) apparently conflicting positions. Competitive interscholastic debate is uniquely different because there is not a possibility for compromise on the ultimate question of who did the better debating; most tournaments prohibit double wins, and no debaters would agree to a double loss. The competition is absolute; one side must win and one side must lose. This is radically different from the ability of individuals to be persuaded by the other side of a social movement. The switching of sides outside of the debate context comes from a person’s willingness to be persuaded by a particular position; it is not forced by tournament rules. Thus, the competitive structures of competitive interscholastic debate render the applicability of philosophical or rhetorical theory inapplicable to the extent that it does not account for particular competitive interscholastic debate context. The unique structures of debate rounds rob all arguments or positions therein (or in a series of rounds) of any persuasive value beyond the very narrow issue of “which side did the better debating.” The competitive element and tournament structure of competitive interscholastic debate taint all positions proffered in a debate round to create social change with a stench of “I am actually lying about my goals; I am clearly just using this argument to win the ballot.” Even debates about how debates should proceed (i.e. theory arguments or arguments about the practices in debate, or “meta-debate” (debates about debate)) are not proffered for the truth of the proposition, but to win the debate. The audience—only the judge—is solely concerned with the ultimate question: “Which side did the better debating?” Competitive interscholastic debate is certainly a venue in which students can become aware of societal issues and topics of concern. But the persuasive value of arguments presented in a debate round to convince debaters of the truth of either side on a topic is virtually nil. Students will generally form opinions about issues they learn about in a debate round outside of their debate rounds. The issues debaters become aware of include issues external to debate (e.g. affirmative action, foreign policy) and issues internal to debate (e.g. theory, community issues). When debaters choose to bring those issues into a debate round, they necessarily use those issues as a competitive means to the ultimate end of convincing the judge that they did the better debating. This requires the opposing team to adopt a competitive counterstrategy to that position; it forecloses the option of the opposing team being fully persuaded by the other team’s position. Even an attempt to “compromise” via a permutation (as a competitive strategy rather than a persuasive position) will meet vigorous, usually-pre-scripted opposition. As a result, any in-round action (whether a speech act or the judge voting for one team or the other) will have no out-of-round effect consistent with or contemplated by any cited authors or postulated by the high school or college student making the assertion. Even arguments about competitive interscholastic debate—primarily theory and issues about inequalities in the debate community—will necessarily lose all persuasive value about those particular issues when they are raised in a debate round. Although more specific to competitive interscholastic debate and not general theories about academic debate, meta-debate loses its power to convince anyone in the round because the audience—only the judge—is solely concerned with the question of “which team did the better debating.” Theory and arguments about “social issues in debate” made in a debate inherently reek of disingenuousness. Most debaters and judges do not even consider adopting a position on the meta-debate until after the round in reflective discussion and thought about the issue, thought that never incorporates the truthfulness of an argument because “it was dropped” in a debate round. In the particular debate, the result is always based on who, in the judge’s opinion, did the better debating. It is not based on who convinced the judge of some proposition irrelevant to deciding which team did the better debating. The preceding discussion demonstrates why arguments about social change— even social change within the debate community—have persuasive value only outside of a debate round. The debate community has developed multiple forums in which members of the community engage in noncompetitive and, sometimes, academic debate on issues within the debate community. These include discussions before and after rounds with judges, teammates, and competitors; on forums or online message boards; or in academic publications. For the social issues external to the debate community, there are almost an unlimited number of ways that students form opinions. And, after students form their opinions and join causes and organizations, there are about an equal number of non-competitive ways that students can use techniques and modes of persuasion discussed by academics and rhetorical theories. Debate rounds, at the very most, operate as venue solely for raising awareness about social issues and debate practices. It would be illogical to conclude that, because issues were debated in a particular debate and out-of-round discussion about that practice followed, the in-round debate created a social change. Because coaches and students strategically consider their arguments and practices prior to a debate round, the social issues or the “concern” about a debate tactic initially spawns outside of debate rounds, not from within a singular debate round. And just because one event occurred before another does not make the former the cause of the latter. To the extent that the in-round practice causes a subsequent out-of-round discussion, debate is admittedly a form for raising awareness about practices and social issues for students. But the arguments presented in the debate round will lack persuasive value insofar as convincing the judge in the round of anything beyond the ultimate question of who did the better debating. But even if this article’s arguments up to this point have no validity, and creating social change through debate rounds is more likely than just theoretically possible, this is insufficient to adopt the proposition that competitive interscholastic debate creates social change. It remains a fiction because no academics—not even those who have remained in the debate community for decades—have attempted to prove its validity with any form of study or survey. No studies or surveys have been conducted on any particular application of philosophical or rhetorical theory to the practices within competitive interscholastic debate. Thus, competitive interscholastic debates and meta-debates therein claiming to create some sort of change either within the community or outside the community have no empirical support. They simply present the possibility, but fail to show any probability of success. Because any critically thinking person (in or out of the debate community) should be hesitant to presume probability based on mere possibility, the probability of the general theory being applicable in the competitive interscholastic debate context should be presumed to be zero, as no probability has been proven. Although practices have certainly evolved, no empirical study has causally linked this evolution to in-round arguments to the exclusion of out-of-round, non-competitive discussions. Why We Should Get Over This Fiction Fictions are neither inherently good nor inherently bad. Fictions must be judged based on whether they serve some relevant purpose to the context in which the fiction is adopted. The legal fiction that all people are presumed to know the law is one such fiction. If no one follows laws, then passing laws is pointless. Therefore, compliance with the law is fundamental. The fiction that people are presumed to know the law encourages individuals to know the law and increases compliance. If individuals can shield themselves from the ramifications of violating the law by not knowing the law, people would be encouraged to avoid learning about the law to excuse or justify non-compliance. The methodology for determining whether a fiction is good or bad must include: (1) an identification of whether the proposition is a fiction; (2) what the purposes of the context, field, or activity that is considering adoption of the fiction; and (3) whether the fiction advances or hinders those purposes. Up until this point, this article has argued why it is a fiction to believe that debate rounds cause social change. And, as was discussed at length in Nix the Nixonism: Identifying the Purposes of Debate by Understanding Constituency, Transparency & Accountability, the primary purposes of debate are self-preservation and to promote skills including public speaking, researching, and critical thinking as judged by the larger academic community and the general public. Thus, deciding whether to dispense with the fiction of “social change through debate” is a worthwhile endeavor will require determining whether this fiction promotes or hinders the self-preservation of the community and promotes skills including public speaking, research, and critical thinking. Although either maintaining or dispensing with the fiction would likely be neutral with respect to promoting public speaking, researching, and critical thinking skills, the fiction continues to deal damaging blows to the debate community. These damaging effects can be shown anecdotally. The fiction has damaged the legitimacy of the debate community by encouraging a race to the bottom in terms of debaters—in a competitive flurry—trying to outdo each other and themselves. The best examples of this are in college policy debate, which has existed for much longer than any other interscholastic debate format in the U.S. The development of the “kritik” opened possibilities for deployment of a new body of literature in rounds. The race to the bottom has caused the debate community’s acceptance of the following in-round tactics: stripping nude to de-mystify the female body; dance-offs; defecating into a bag to face our waste; simulating an abortion; actual in round violence between debate partners to illustrate and dramatize domestic violence; voting down white debaters because they were white in order to promote minority participation in competitive interscholastic debate; and debating with the lights off to performatively save energy. Those outside of the debate community in academic and professional circles have noticed this downward trend in competitive interscholastic debate. As a result of this trend, debate is currently viewed as having diminished educational value. This presents a very real threat to the existence of schools’ debate programs. A possible advantage of adopting the fiction is that if students believe in the persuasive power of their positions, then they would be more likely to recommunicate the message in non-competitive formats outside of the competitive interscholastic debate community. Not only has this argument been empirically disproven, the opposite has proven to be true. Most debaters are involved in few, if any, other extra-curricular activities. Sometimes debate programs discourage participation in other activities to hone skills unique to competitive interscholastic debate (e.g. spreading). Furthermore, to the extent that debaters are convinced of their own argument that debate can create social change, the fiction discourages participation in more effective methods of persuasion that do not require the participants to contradict themselves. Students are led to believe that they have accomplished something when, in fact, they have contributed nothing (except to the decline of the community). Additionally, arguing that debate can create social change by the judge voting for the argument is also unethical. The fiction of social change through debate is powerful because it abuses debate’s structures designed to ensure fairness and minimize arbitrariness in judges’ decision-making. One primary structure is the contractual requirement that when the judges sign their ballots, they are voting for the team that does the better debating, as they have contracted with the tournament to do so. When the judge agrees with the host school to judge, he has promised to vote for the debaters who do the better debating. An argument that voting for one team over the other solely because of some out-of-round benefit compromises the judge’s objectivity of evaluating who did the better debating through the arguments made in the particular debate round. In essence, it is a promise for a benefit outside of the debate round in exchange for the ballot that would outweigh the judge’s sense of duty to remain objective and decide the round on who did the better debating. In this sense, endorsing the fiction of social change through debate is, by definition, is endorsing bribery. The only way this ethical dilemma would not exist would be for debaters relying on the fiction to admit that there really is no out-of-round benefit, which is this article’s ultimate point. Not only does the fiction unfairly place the judge in an ethical dilemma, it is also unfair by asking the judge to consider and accept out-of-round benefits of voting for a particular team but ignore all of the judge’s and other debaters’ personal out of-round experiences. In debate rounds, judges attempt to adopt neutral, objective paradigms by not disregarding an argument simply because they personally disagree or do not like it. The general motivation for this is to be fair to the students and allow them an opportunity to succeed despite the judge’s idiosyncratic preferences, the full disclosure of which would take too long to explain prior to a debate or write in a paradigm (although some judges definitely try). The fiction of social change through debate invites the judge to insert his or her subjective preferences only to the extent the judge personally agrees. If the judge personally disagrees with the team’s particular social goals, the judge will be shunned by rejecting the team’s argument absent some argument that the opposing team wins “on the flow.” But if the judge personally agrees with the team’s particular social goals (or at least what the debaters purport their social goals to be), then the debaters relying on the fiction of social change through debate invites and attempts to justify judges’ intervention only to the extent it benefits them even if the argument is not won “on the flow.” This is true because arguments about what the ballot can would, if the argument is true (or dropped), outweigh a technically bad performance by the debaters relying on those arguments. By placing the judge in an ethical dilemma, bribing the judge, and inviting and justifying one-sided intervention, the fiction of social change through debate encourages debaters to commit the ultimate in-round abuse. Arguments and strategies are not, by themselves, properly considered unfair or abusive to another debater. There are always counter-arguments and counter-strategies. Tactics—or the in-round conduct of debaters—can be unfair and abusive. For example, card clipping (purporting to read the entirety of a card but only reading part of it), hiding the other team’s evidence, name-calling, promising the judge money or job in exchange for voting for a particular team, blanket refusal to answer questions in cross-examination, and other rule violations (meaning the actual rules of the debate tournament or the organization under which the tournament is conducted) are all examples of tactics that are unfair and abusive. These tactics and the fiction of social change through debate place the judge in an ethical dilemma, bribe the judge with out-of-round compensation to vote for a team who does not do the better debating, and invite and justify one-sided intervention. They compromise the integrity of the activity and are thus the ultimate unfair tactics and the worst forms of in round abuse. The fiction of social change through debate abuses the win–loss structure of debate and permits debaters to otherize, demonize, dehumanize, and exclude opponents. The win–loss structure of debate rounds requires a judge to vote for one side or the other, as judges generally cannot give a double win. This precludes the possibility of compromise on any major position in the debate when the resolution of the position would determine the ultimate issue of “which team did the better debating.” Thus, the fiction of social change through debate encourages debaters to construct narratives of good versus evil in which the other team is representative of some evil that threatens to bring about our destruction if it is endorsed (e.g. capitalism). The team relying on the fiction of social change through debate then paints themselves as agents of the good, and gives the judge a George W. Bush-like “option”: “You’re either with us or you’re against us.” The fiction of social change through debate—like Bush’s rhetorical fear tactics and creation of a false, polarizing, and exclusionary dichotomy to justify all parts of the War on Terror—enables the otherization, demonization, dehumanization, and exclusion of the opposing team. When the unfairness of this tactic is brought to light—particularly in egregious situations when a team is arguing that the other team should lose because of their skin color—all can see that the debate centers on personal attacks against opposing debaters. This causes tensions between debaters that frequently result in debaters losing interest or quitting. By alienating and excluding members of the competitive interscholastic debate community for the purpose of winning a debate, it also makes the reaching of any compromise outside of the debate—the only place where compromise is possible—much less likely. By bringing the social issue into a debate round, debaters impede out-of round progress on the resolution of social issues within and outside the debate community by prompting backlash.

#### Turn- The aff’s appropriation of the notion “fungibility” is built directly on and performs the fungibility of blackness. They attempt to describe their own exclusion through the language given meaning by the violent abjection of blackness. This is a ruse of analogy that is parasitic on gratuitous anti-black violence and the labor of countless debaters who gave the term “fungibility” meaning in debate. This renders the condition of antiblackness illegible.

Wilderson 10 [Frank, Assoc Prof of African American Studies at UC-Irvine, Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, p.21-2]

The most salient feature of Dorsey's findings is not his understanding of the way Blackness, as a crucial and fungible conceptual possession of civil society, impacts and destabilizes previously accepted categories of intra-White thought. Most important, instead, is his contribution to the evidence that, even when Blackness is deployed to stretch the elasticity of civil society to the point of civil war, that expansion is never elastic enough to embrace the very Black who catalyzed the expansion. In fact, Dorsey, building on Bradley's historical research, asserts that just the opposite is true. The more the political imagination of civil society is enabled by the fungibility of the slave metaphor, the less legible the condition of the slave becomes: "Focusing primarily on colonial newspapers . . . Bradley finds that the slavery metaphor 'served to distance the patriot agenda from the antislavery movement.' If anything, Bradley states, widespread use of the metaphor 'gave first evidence that the issue of real slavery was not to have a part in the revolutionary messages.'"35 And Eltis believes that this philosophical incongruity between the image of the Slave and freedom for the Slave begins in Europe and predates the American Revolution by at least one hundred years: "The [European] countries least likely to enslave their own had the harshest and most sophisticated system of exploiting enslaved non-Europeans. Overall, the English and Dutch conception of the role of the individual in metropolitan society ensured the accelerated development of African chattel slavery in the Americas . . . because their own subjects could not become chattel slaves or even convicts for life."36 Furthermore, the circulation of Blackness as metaphor and image at the most politically volatile and progressive moments in history (e.g., the French, English, and American revolutions) produces dreams of liberation which are more inessential to and more parasitic on the Black, and more emphatic in their guarantee of Black suffering, than any dream of human liberation in any era heretofore.

#### History lesson – the affirmative is completely wrong on the direction the community has moved on hybrid teams – the 2013 NDT did not mark the beginning of a crackdown on hybrid teams – quite the opposite – Hybrids had NEVER been allowed at the NDT previously – when it became obvious that the Emporia team who won it all was actually a hybrid the NDT Committee crafted language to ALLOW hybrid teams to compete but linked them to benchmarks schools wishing to participate in a hybrid partnership had to meet.

#### And, the status quo already does the plan –every tournament that runs a policy debate division ALLOWS hybrid teams to compete – the aff is literally the status quo so vote neg on presumption

#### Hybrids are allowed at CEDA Nationals

CEDA Nationals Tournament Invitation 2021

Hybrids: The practice of entering hybrid school teams is allowed. Teams may be composed of two students from different member schools, so long as the judging requirements are met. All hybrids should be confirmed with the tournament director to ensure proper round pairing.

#### Hybrid teams are allowed at the NDT - NDT Standing Rules on Participant Qualification (Rule II (2) provides the hybrid team exception to team eligibility:

2. Team eligibility: Hybrid Exception Waiver: An intra-district hybrid team composed of two debaters from two different schools may petition the NDT Committee Chair for a waiver from the Appeals Committee of Standing Rule II.A.1.(b) to participate in District Qualification for the NDT if:

a. Two-thirds of the member schools of the District in question vote to approve participation of the team in question, AND

b. The hybrid team meets all of the following criteria:

(1) The individual hybrid team has 24 preliminary rounds of varsity or open collegiate competition TOGETHER on the topic over 4 tournaments with at least 6 teams from 4 different schools.

(2) The schools represented by the individual debaters historically and currently operate a joint program demonstrated by, but not limited to, a shared budget, coaching staff, travel, and meetings/practices.

(3) The schools for the debaters are traditionally represented as the same "program" for the purposes of competition, either by competing under one school name or consistent representation as the hybrid, unless prevented from doing so by individual tournament registration or tabulation procedures.

(4) The ability for at least one program of the two schools represented to participate in intercollegiate competitive debate would be jeopardized without the combination of resources, documented by either the lack of an official coaching/director position within the educational institution, a program budget of less than $3000 excluding coaching/judging compensation, or a lack of an established/recognized debate program in either a department or student organization.

(5) One student in the hybrid team is the ONLY Open collegiate debater from their college.

(6) A hybrid team provides evidence of substantial program development efforts at one or both of the team member’s home institutions.

c. The submission to the NDT Committee Chair must be made by the January 23 immediately preceding the NDT in which the team wishes to participate, and will be forwarded by the Committee Chair to the Appeals Committee. The Appeals Committee will respond within one week of the submission of the request for the waiver.

B. These rules do not overrule any other eligibility requirements in number of rounds or tournaments attended for determining bids. Districts may make additional considerations or constraints on the participation of hybrids at their qualifier tournaments. The validity of any hybrid team qualifying for the NDT may be challenged through the normal petition process with the Appeals Subcommittee of the NDT as outlined in the Standing Rules of the NDT Committee, Section IV (Rules of Procedure) if it can be substantiated that such a partnership is in violation of the above criteria. Otherwise, a team granted such a waiver is considered eligible to compete in the NDT if they qualify through the District Qualification process and will count towards the total number of teams in the District for purposes of Bid Allocation.

C. Intra-district schools in such a hybrid must BOTH have either an institutional membership in the AFA or have a director who has an individual membership in the AFA and must pay NDT dues for BOTH schools. (This is not a JOINT membership). The qualification of such a hybrid teams would count against the total number of qualifying teams for BOTH schools.

D. Schools may only petition for this exemption a maximum of 5 times. Schools may no longer petition for the waiver after qualifying for the NDT through this process

3. Should teams withdraw or become ineligible for the tournament after their qualification:

a. their bid will go to the highest rated team in the Second Round At-Large selection not having qualified.

b. if procedure a fails to provide a team the bid will go to the next highest rated team in the Second Round At-Large selection not having qualified.

c. if procedures (a) or (b) fail to provide a team the tournament Director is authorized to designate a team.

4. Should a debater or a team be unable to participate in any debate at the National Debate Tournament, the team shall forfeit the round and receive zero points.

#### Accommodation of hybrid teams doesn’t solve retention – GU reads Green.

**SWG 21** (Sustainability Working Group, [https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xkgykCzSPU4Qb4t6q9pvorewZfYy\_0ZofeasAKVDtXk/edit#](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1xkgykCzSPU4Qb4t6q9pvorewZfYy_0ZofeasAKVDtXk/edit), Accessed 8/30/21)

Declining Participation

The NDT has been experiencing a steady decline in membership that has accelerated over the previous three years. To identify why those programs no longer participate the SWG contacted directors from the 22 schools departing between 2018-2021. Sixteen of those programs still maintain active speech and debate programs, with most still participating in alternative debate formats. (NFA-LD, NPDA, APDA, IPDA, BP).That data shows that the overall trend is not being driven by programs getting eliminated, with only three departures due to budget elimination. Instead, teams are making the active decision to not participate in the NDT college policy debate community. While there are a number of nuanced factors driving the decision, many are rooted in budget constraints that directors find insurmountable to successfully compete in college policy debate. The following are the reasons provided (in order, with most common to least common)

The lack of regional tournaments. The lack of regional tournaments has greatly driven up the price of tournaments, requiring longer travel, more missed school etc. As noted above many programs are still waiting to see how the pandemic is going to impact their budgets in both the short and long term, with many feeling they are at risk of permanent deep cuts.

The lack of novice and JV opportunities. The average novice division this season averaged 12 entries and in many districts novice divisions have dried up entirely. Reasons cited are both that there simply are not divisions to attend, but also that what is being offered is no the experience their novices are interested in. Most novices are not dreaming of the NDT, they are trying to build their resume and skill set without missing much class or interfering with the ten other clubs and activities they are involved in. The time commitment and contemporary style of college policy debate were deterrents to many “classroom debaters” who are not looking for the fast talking, research and time intensive practices of the NDT.

A smaller pool of policy debaters to draw from. The lack of recruits due to declines in high school policy participation and overall student interest in continuing their debate careers in college is another concern cited. Data suggests declining participation in policy debate is not limited to college programs. Participation in policy debate at the high school level is also seeing substantial decline. The data below come from the NSDA.

\*Chart Omitted\*

The last five years have seen a disastrous decline of high school participation in policy debate. Losing over a third of the students participating will only accelerate the trends of declining NDT programs. Several respondents mentioned a major barrier to policy participation is the lack of policy programs in their traditional recruiting bases. For example, many state regional universities have difficulty recruiting from out of state because out of state tuition makes these options unaffordable. For example, 12 hours at UCO for an instate student costs around $3800. For an out of state student, the same 12 hours would cost $8100. Eight of the 22 schools no longer subscribing to the NDT fall into the regional state university category.

The cost to play is out of reach. Directors cited the exorbitant costs to attempt to successfully compete on the national level. Airfare, hotel, and related travel costs mean 1000s of dollars in scarce resources must be focused on a small number of students, resulting in many fewer opportunities for students who do not attend resource rich programs.

The professionalization of coaching staffs. Directors cited the growth of the hired card cutters and expansive staffs of the resource rich programs as significant obstacles perceived by coaches and students. While there are examples of schools with small coaching staffs doing well those tend to be the exception not the norm. It comes as no surprise that the most resource rich programs with the largest coaching staffs dominate success on the national level and at the NDT.

Lack of student interest in policy debate. Competition can require significant amounts of missed class time, force tradeoffs with other campus interests, and interfere with student’s ability to hold employment.

#### And, proves the affirmative isn’t inherent –– we literally can’t say hybrid teams bad because we couldn’t win uniqueness – that’s a voter for ground

#### Turn – The ballots as a method to validate hybrid teams fails and reproduces factionalism

Karlberg 03 (Michael, Assistant Professor of Communication at Western Washington University, PEACE & CHANGE, v28, n3, July, p. 339-41)

Granted, social activists do "win" occasional “battles” in these adversarial arenas, but the root causes of their concerns largely remain unaddressed and the larger "wars" arguably are not going well. Consider the case of environmental activism. Countless environmental protests, lobbies, and lawsuits mounted in recent generations throughout the Western world. Many small victories have been won. Yet environmental degradation continues to accelerate at a rate that far outpaces the highly circumscribed advances made in these limited battles the most committed environmentalists acknowledge things are not going well. In addition, adversarial strategies of social change embody assumptions that have internal consequences for social movements, such as internal factionalization. For instance, virtually all of the social projects of the "left” throughout the 20th century have suffered from recurrent internal factionalization. The opening decades of the century were marked by political infighting among vanguard communist revolutionaries. The middle decades of the century were marked by theoretical disputes among leftist intellectuals. The century's closing decades have been marked by the fracturing of the a new left\*\* under the centrifugal pressures of identity politics. Underlying this pattern of infighting and factionalization is the tendency to interpret differences—of class, race, gender, perspective, or strategy—as sources of antagonism and conflict. In this regard, the political "left" and "right" both define themselves in terms at a common adversary—the "other"—defined by political differences. Not surprisingly, advocates of both the left and right frequently invoke the need for internal unity in order to prevail over their adversaries on the other side of the alleged political spectrum. However, because the terms left and right axe both artificial and reified categories that do not reflect the complexity of actual social relations, values, or beliefs, there is no way to achieve lasting unity within either camp because there are no actual boundaries between them. In reality, social relations, values, and beliefs are infinitely complex and variable. Yet once an adversarial posture is adopted by assuming that differences are sources at conflict, initial distinctions between the left and the right inevitably are followed by subsequent distinctions within the left and the right. Once this centrifugal process is set in motion, it is difficult, if not impossible, to restrain. For all of these reasons, adversarial strategies have reached a point of diminishing returns even if such strategies were necessary and viable in the past when human populations were less socially and ecologically interdependent those conditions no longer exist. Our reproductive and technological success as a species has led to conditions of unprecedented interdependence, and no group on the planet is isolated any longer. Under these new conditions, new strategies not only are possible but are essential. Humanity has become a single interdependent social body. In order to meet the complex social and environmental challenges now facng us, we must learn to coordinate our collective actions. Yet a body cannot coordinate its actions as long as its "left" and is "right," or its "north" and its "south," or its "east" and its "west" are locked in adversarial relationships.

#### Impacts about debate and the assumption that winning ballots has political force to solve ­­­­rhetoric in debate is bourgeois ideology – to think that ballots in Round 6 of the Harvard tournamnet can change material conditions is inseparable from magical voluntarism.

Cloud and Gunn 10 (Joshua Gunn & Dana L. Cloud, Department of Communication, University of Texas at Austin, "Agentic Orientation as Magical Voluntarism" Communication Theory 20 (2010) 50–78 © 2010 International Communication Association//shree)

Over a decade ago anthropologists Jean and John L. Comaroff (1999) advanced the provocative thesis that globalization in late capitalism has led to ‘‘a dramatic intensification . . . of appeals to enchantment,’’ often most discernable in industrializing countries such as South Africa (p. 282). From ‘‘get rich quick’’ pyramid schemes to e-mail promises from millionaire widows in Nigeria, ‘‘capitalism has an effervescent new spirit—a magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist—welling up close to its core’’ (p. 281). Of course, over a half-century ago Theodor Adorno (1994) inveighed against astrology and soothsaying as indices of economic magic, underscoring the ability of capitalism to promote the ‘‘doctrine of the existence of spirit’’ so central to bourgeois consciousness. ‘‘In the concept of mind-in-itself,’’ argued Adorno, ‘‘consciousness has ontologically justified and perpetuated privilege by making it independent of the social principle by which it is constituted. Such ideology explodes in occultism: It is Idealism come full circle’’ (p. 133).What the Comaroffs point to is not the arrival of a new form of magical thinking, then, but the intensification and proliferation of postenlightenment gullibility via globalization—ironically in what is presumably the age of cynical reason (e.g., Sloterdijk, 1987). As human beings, academics are just as susceptible to magical thinking and narcissistic fantasies of omnipotence as everyone else. Perhaps because at some level of communication scholars tend to entertain a sense of the magical in the idea of communication (see Peters, 1999), we have been particularly prone to a philosophical belief in what we term ‘‘magical voluntarism,’’ the notion that human agency is better understood as the ability to control a given phenomenon through the proper manipulation of thoughts and symbols (e.g., language). Going well beyond the straightforward idea that our thoughts necessarily influence our actions in transforming the world around us, what we are calling magical voluntarism fosters a deliberate misrecognition of material recalcitrance, an inability to recognize the structural, political, economic, cultural, and psychical limits of an individual’s ability to act in her own interests. Furthermore, magical voluntarism refuses to acknowledge that there is a limit to the efficacy of symbolic action, beyond which persuasion and thought alone fail to shift existing social relations. In popular culture, magical voluntarism is typified by the bestselling book and DVD The Secret (Byrne, 2006; Heriot, 2006), which teach the reader/viewer that ‘‘[y]our life right now is a reflection of your thoughts. That includes all great things, and all the things you consider not so great. Since you attract to you what you think about most, it is easy to see what your dominant thoughts have been on every subject of your life, because that is what you experienced’’ (Byrne, 2006, p. 9). The ‘‘magical, neo-Protestant zeitgeist’’ typified by the raging success of The Secret (see McGee, 2007) indicates that enchantment is not limited to developing countries, but is also a crowning achievement of late capitalism in the postindustrial world. Nor is magical thinking limited to popular culture. As a recent essay in this journal by Sonja K. Foss, William J. Waters, and Bernard J. Armada (2007) demonstrates, magical thinking has some purchase in the field of communication studies (see also Geisler, 2005; Villadsen, 2008).1 According to Foss, Waters, and Armada, human agency is simply a matter of consciously choosing among differing interpretations of reality. We argue that the understanding of agency advanced by Foss, Waters, and Armada is informed by the same voluntarist ideology that has enchanted The Secret’s millions of readers. Below we advance a conception of agency as an open question in order to combat magical thinking in contemporary communication theory. Although we approach the concept of agency from different theoretical standpoints (one of us from the perspective of psychoanalysis, the other, classical Marxism), we are mutually opposed to the (bourgeois) idealism of magical voluntarism in recent work in communication and rhetorical studies on agency.2 Our primary vehicle of argument is a critique of Foss, Waters, and Armada’s essay, ‘‘Toward a Theory of Agentic Orientation: Rhetoric and Agency in Run Lola Run,’’ which represents a magical-voluntaristic brand of practical reason (phronesis) that is increasingly discredited among a number rhetorical scholars. We are particularly alarmed by the suggestion that even in ‘‘situations’’ such as ‘‘imprisonment or genocide . . . agents have choices about how to perceive their conditions and their agency . . . [which] opens up opportunities for innovating . . . in ways unavailable to those who construct themselves as victims’’ (p. 33). The idea that one can choose an ‘‘agentic orientation’’ regardless of context and despite material limitation not only ignores two decades of research within the field of communication studies on agency and its limitations (and is thus ‘‘regressive’’ in more than one sense), but tacitly promotes a belief in wish-fulfillment through visualization and the imagination, as well as a commitment to radical individualism and autonomy. As a consequence, embracing magical voluntarism leads to narcissistic complacency, regressive infantilism, and elitist arrogance.

#### Rejecting the possibility that others can formulate a discourse of concern around hybrid teams locks you in a feedback loop of narcissistic self-confirmation - these undercut bargaining power that CAN shape institutions and achieve gains – so change is possible, but the way you choose to do it fails miserably

McBride 3 –Professor of Government @ London School of Economics (Cillian, “Self-transparency and the possibility of deliberative politics,” Journal of Political Ideologies, 8.3)

This view is, however, not only philosophically suspect, but it also presents insuperable difficulties for a specifically deliberative politics. This is not imme- diately apparent when we focus simply on the issue of representation, but only when we turn our attention to the point of a more inclusive style of politics. While including the marginalized may affect decision-making simply by altering the parliamentary arithmetic, at least some of those who argue for inclusion also think that inclusion is a precondition of a communicative, or deliberative politics.13 The hope is not simply that the bargaining power of the marginalized groups may be increased, but that if they are present to articulate their interests, then others may reassess the accuracy and legitimacy of their own policy preferences in the light of these exchanges. Even assuming that those wielding power are committed to formulating policies which are aimed at benefiting the marginalized, if these policies are constructed without talking to those at whom they are directed, but only by talking about them to various experts, etc., then¶ 292¶ crucial information may be overlooked.14 Inclusion is not, therefore an end in itself: we are not concerned simply with the equal opportunity of members of marginalized groups to become parliamentary representatives, but with improv- ing the quality and, crucially, the legitimacy of decisions by promoting dialogue between all of those potentially affected.15¶ How can such a dialogue, involving not only articulation of views, but also their modification, get off the ground on the assumption of self-transparency and authority? If differently situated others cannot become properly ac- quainted with my standpoint, how can I communicate with them? The argument for representation exploits the inaccessibility of experience at the cost of communication and deliberation. On the one hand, the experience and self-interpretation of group members is unique and inviolable, but on the other hand it is also the case that this assumption traps each of us within the circle of our own subjectivity. Even if the claim is weakened to allow for commu- nicability, as long as it retains incorrigibility then we must still fall short of genuine dialogue, substituting for it the mere exchange of testimony.16 This is not to say that testimony has no place in deliberation, but it cannot supplant the mutual adjustment of conversation, which does not require passive listen- ing to the other but an active engagement with their views and the exposure of one’s own certainties to potential revision in the light of this engagement. A genuine dialogue, as Gadamer points out, is premised not simply on the authority of the speaker but on the assumption that one may have something to learn from one’s interlocutor, and that through engaging in dialogue one enlarges one’s own understanding.17 On this view, the possibility of dialogue is premised on the recognition of the limited, incomplete nature of one’s own understanding, including one’s understanding of oneself. What is required here is not authority, but rather a measure of humility in the light of one’s own finite nature.¶ If we are to have a deliberative politics, we shall have to surrender the idea of authoritative self-interpretation which must prevent genuine dialogue from taking place through removing my understanding of myself and my interests from the agenda. Surrendering this idea does not require us to surrender the idea that we are situated beings, who may view the world in different ways, depending on our particular situations. The pluralizing significance of situation and the demand for inclusive politics to which it gives rise can be retained, even if it must be re-conceptualized. In place of the idea that experience necessarily renders my situation transparent to me, we would do better to adopt the hermeneutic view that my situation and myself must be to some extent opaque to me, as deliberative politics cannot be made to cohere with the former view. The need to adopt such a view is not explained, of course, by the fact that such a view just happens to fit better with a preference for deliberative politics. Once we frankly acknowledge the imperfect nature of our self-understandings, then we will be sensitive to the possibility that these understandings may be distorted or deficient in significant ways, and it is our interest in acting autonomously and escaping the influence of those aspects of our situation which threaten our autonomy which drives our concern to engage in potentially transformative dialogue and to participate inapolitics which fosters such exchanges.18

#### Their prioritization of experience as the starting point for all political action is a dangerous epistemological move which elevates identity over deliberation—their methodology is a breeding ground for violent factionalism, not progressive politics.

Ireland 2002 [Craig , American Culture—Bilkent “The Appeal to Experience and its Consequences,” Cultural Critique 52 Fall 2002 p.87-89 //liam]

Once an arcane philosophical term, experience over the last three decades has become a general buzzword. By the 1970s, experience spilled over into the streets, so to speak, and it has since then become the stuff of programmatic manifestos and has been enlisted as the ground from which microstrategies of resistance and subaltern counterhistories can be erected. But for all the blows and counterblows that have carried on for over three decades between those who appeal to the counterhegemonic potential of experience and those who see such appeals as naive voluntarism, such debates show no signs of abating. On the contrary, they have become yet more strident, as can be seen by Michael Pickering's recent attempt to rehabilitate the viability of the term "experience" for subaltern historiography by turning to E. P. Thompson and Dilthey and, more recently still, by Sonia Kruks's polemical defense of experience for subaltern inquiry by way of a reminder that poststructuralist critics of experience owe much to those very thinkers, from Sartre to Merleau-Ponty, whom they have debunked as if in oedipal rebellion against their begetters. Such debates over experience have so far gravitated around issues of epistemology and agency, pitting those who debunk experience as the stuff of an antiquated philosophy of consciousness against those who argue that subaltern experience provides an enclave against strong structural determination. Lost in such debates, however, have been the potential consequences of appeals to immediate experience as a ground for subaltern agency and specificity. And it is just such potential consequences that will be examined here. These indeed demand our attention, for more is at stake in the appeal to experience than some epistemological faux pas. By so wagering on the perceived immediacy of experience as the evidence for subaltern specificity and counterhegemonic action, appeals to immediate experience, however laudable their goal, end up unwittingly naturalizing what is in fact historical, and, in so doing, they leave the door as wide-open to a progressive politics of identity as to a retreat to neoethnic tribalism. Most alarming about such appeals to [End Page 87] experience is not some failure of epistemological nerve—it is instead their ambiguous political and social ramifications. And these have reverberated beyond academia and found an echo in para-academia— so much so that experience has increasingly become the core concept or key word of subaltern groups and the rallying call for what Craig Calhoun calls the "new social movements" in which "experience is made the pure ground of knowledge, the basis of an essentialized standpoint of critical awareness" (468 n.64). The consequences of such appeals to experience can best be addressed not by individually considering disparate currents, but by seeking their common denominator. And in this regard, E. P. Thompson will occupy the foreground. It is safe to say that what started as an altercation between Thompson and Althusser has since spawned academic and para-academic "histories from below" and subaltern cultural inquiries that, for all their differences, share the idea that the identities and counterhistories of the disenfranchised can be buttressed by the specificity of a group's concrete experiences. Much theorizing on experience by certain cultural and historiographical trends, as many have already pointed out, has been but a variation on a persistent Thompsonian theme in which Thompson's "kind of use of experience has the same foundational status if we substitute 'women's' or 'black' or 'lesbian' or 'homosexual' for 'working class'" (Scott, 786).

#### No spillover solvency – there’s no internal link between micropolitical interruption and macropolitical change. The claim that it’s a “prerequisite” is the link to our arg

Carrabregu 13 (Gent Carrabregu, MA, PhD candidate in political science at Northwestern, “The Democratic Limits of the Ethical Turn-Myers's Worldly Ethics,” Theory & Event Volume 16, Issue 3, 2013)

In the hands of William Connolly's agonistic pluralism, the Foucauldian ethics of self-care is tied more explicitly to democratic practice, which is a most welcome move, even if it continues to beg the question. For Myers, **the problem is two-fold**. **First**, **what is the ground on the basis of which arts of self-craftsmanship aiming at micropolitical interventions on the self can provide an impetus to collective political mobilization**; and **secondly, why should we expect that**, in case they do, they will produce recognizable democratic effects instead of leading to **cynical withdrawal** or **narcissistic self-absorption**. In her view, when Connolly ties his analysis to actual political movements, such as the movement for the right to die, micropolitical interventions on the self will lead to democratic collective action because "they work in tandem" with political movements that engage something in the world by effecting its transformation from a matter of fact to a matter of common concern; but this is not something that can be conceptually underwritten, Myers insists, by his commitment to an ethics of self-care. Indeed, such a commitment puts Connolly at odds with the aims of a **political ethics oriented toward the world because**, more often than not, **it leads to a privileging of "action by the self on itself as a starting point and necessary prelude to macropolitical change"** (44). **This order of priority**, whether conceptual or chronological, **is not something that a conception of political ethics oriented toward care for the world,** such as Myers's "worldly ethics," **can possibly embrace.** On the other hand, the Levinasian conception of ethics, viewed through the lens of care for the world and the picture of associative democracy with which it seeks to captivate our political imagination, is just the other side of the ethical turn's coin. In addition to the similar questions already begged by Foucault's and Connolly's ethics of self-care, Levinasian ethics introduces yet another problematic and question-begging feature: namely, the "unequal dyadic model of charitable obligation" (62). This model that underwrites Levinas's conception of ethics as infinite responsibility to the singular Other is questionable before the bar of critical democratic reason for three interrelated reasons. First, it is anti-egalitarian insofar as it posits a hierarchical relationship between benefactor and recipient; second, it is mostly concerned with the direct fulfillment of basic needs (food, shelter, etc.); and finally, it is not clear whether there is anything political about it given that philanthropic altruism is quite a private affair (71-73). Levinas's later attention to the image of "the third," which some commentators point out to make the case for the political relevance of Levinasian ethics, does not seem convincing to Myers. While it might point to Levinas's acknowledgment that the world involves "multiple Others," this acknowledgment is not yet tied to politics in any recognizable way (68). Especially problematic, even in the face of acknowledging "the third," remains Levinas's rather Platonic view of ethics as the guardian of politics, regulating it by providing benchmarks for its evaluation (67). While certainly going beyond many aspects of Levinas's basic ethical project, Simon Critchley and Judith Butler remain bound to certain Levinasian prejudices that do not quite liberate democratic politics from the straightjacket of "ethics-as-first-philosophy." In the case of Critchley's attempt to link Levinasian ethical insights to democratic politics the main problem seems to be his "elision of the difference between charitable ethics and associative democracy" (71). Such an elision means that Critchley cannot provide an adequate answer to the basic problem of impetus: namely, why should an individual's acceptance of a radical demand to care for a singular Other lead to participation in the collective, democratizing efforts Critchley admires so much? In Myers's view, this lack of proper acknowledgment of the difference between ethics and politics is inherited from a Levinasian figure of thought-namely, the hierarchical relation between ethics and politics, which Critchley re-articulates by conceiving ethics as providing democracy with a "metapolitical moment," which it cannot provide if leftto its own resources (71). While certainly committed to admirable forms of democratic political action, such as the protest movement against the World Trade Organization, it is not clear that Critchley's anarchist politics can be abetted by a conception of ethics that remains heavily indebted to Levinasian tropes. If Critchley's loyalty to Levinas's "unequal dyadic model of charitable obligation" makes him subject to democratic deficits very similar to those of Levinas's original conception, Butler's ethics of universal vulnerability is a more complex elaboration precisely insofar as she departs from the letter of Levinas's ethics, if not exactly from its spirit. Most importantly for Myers, Butler's ethics avoids the hierarchical model of charity by making the singular Other into a generalizable Other standing for the universally shared human condition of vulnerability (78, 79). In addition to this egalitarian ontology of finitude, Butler's close attention to the way precariousness is politically distributed, and the way in which social norms that govern the intelligibility of suffering and pain may de-realize the sufferings of certain powerless groups of people, point clearly toward an admirable political awareness that adopts the right attitude toward the world that Myers wants us to always keep in mind (80). And yet this otherwise admirable reworking of Levinas does not convince her, mainly because no adequate answer is elaborated to address her recurring question of the precise link between this picture of human precariousness and the agency of democratic actors seeking to transform the world in praiseworthy ways. What exactly necessitates the movement from an "affirmation of vulnerability as an unavoidable existential truth" to the injunction to pursue an egalitarian distribution of precariousness is not a question that is answered by Butler (79). Neither is it clear to Myers, unless it might be a case of "cynicism or despair about the possibilities of democratic mobilization," why an ethical imperative beyond politics should be appealing to a thinker, such as Butler, otherwise so attuned to the political workings of normative violence (81). To think beyond the influential yet **problematic therapeutic and charitable models** offered by the ethical turn, Myers thinks we need to begin by **making ethical reflection subordinate to the needs of "associative democracy," understood as collaborative and contentious engagement in the informal political public sphere,** where it is **"a common object in the world" that connects and divides democratic actors**. We need, as it were, a gestalt switch from "ethics-as-first philosophy" to something like **"politics-as-first philosophy."** If we follow her on that front, a conception of ethics as **"care for the world" will begin to emerge.** Unlike the therapeutic and charitable models, this conception of ethics is based on Arendt's notion of love of the world (amor mundi). As a result, **democratic care for the world "is collaborative, expressed in joint action by plural participants"** (86). **In this conception of ethics, the agents and recipients also change. Instead of an individual self caring for himself or for an other singular self, we have an association of selves caring for the world**, understood as "the array of material and immaterial conditions under which human beings live," which is both our home and the mediating space (Arendt's Zwischenraum) between us. The payoff of this alternative for democratic politics, we are told, is consequential for instead of caring for the problem of hunger by engaging **only in therapeutic micropolitical interventions in one's self** (say, fasting) or only on the alleviation of the pain of the Other, worldly ethics makes us **turn to "the collective conditions, including worldly practices, habits, and laws, out of which hunger is born"** (109).

# 2NC

## Textual CP

#### We demand that the debate community adapt to accommodate hybrid debaters.

#### Abandoning “to be” verbs opens up new ways of thinking crucial to avoid the greatest threats to planetary survival

Kellogg & Bourland 91 [E.W. (Prof of Linguistics) & D. David (General Semantics), “Working with E-Prime: Some Practical Notes,” *Et Cetera*, p.376-7]

LISTEN to almost any news program, and you'll hear reports of political, social, and environmental crises. These problems do not originate "outside" of us, but from the beginning have stemmed from the short-sightedness of human beings going about their daily tasks using a two-valued, true-or-false, Aristotelian orientation: an orientation that has proven itself woefully inadequate to solving the complex problems of the twentieth century. Threats of nuclear war, overpopulation, and ecological disaster hang over our heads, and if we wish to survive, the solutions to these problems must also originate from us . The science of ecology teaches us that we need to see through non-Aristotelian eyes, and deal with the world as an interdependent whole of interconnecting parts. And yet the English language itself betrays us in this task, as its very structure trains us to use the old simplistic viewpoint we need so desperately to outgrow. Unless we learn to think and communicate differently and more effectively about our problems, we may soon find ourselves released from the necessity of having to think at all . The authors see E-Prime (English without the verb "to be") as a practical starting point in the development of such a non-Aristotelian language. We hope that our readers will find the information presented here useful should they choose to make E-Prime an integral part of their own lives.

#### Learning to speak in E-Prime allows us to challenge static notions of existence and embrace a world of change and flux

Kellogg & Bourland 91 [E.W. (Prof of Linguistics) & D. David (General Semantics), “Working with E-Prime: Some Practical Notes,” *Et Cetera,* p.385]

Speaking in E-Prime confers a number of advantages to people seriously interested in training themselves in non-Aristotelian thinking . We have found speaking in E-Prime an efficient and effective discipline, as its use forces us to incorporate general semantic principles in an integral way almost every time that we open our mouths . I (E . K.) also frequently translate the speech of others into E-Prime, and this has served me well as a buffer against signal reactions in my own thinking and behavior, and in preventing signal reactions in others . I can often smooth out arguments in my vicinity simply by interjecting E-Prime translations of key statements into conversation . For example, if someone says "That is a stupid idea!" I might reply, "What don't you like about it?" rather than "It is not!" Most importantly however, the discipline of speaking in E-Prime eventually forced me (E . K.) to learn to think in E-Prime . The simplicity of the rule (don't use any forms of "to be") allowed me to make changes in real time, while speaking and eventually while thinking . In learning a foreign language, beginning students continue to think in their native language, while they translate their thoughts as best they can into the language they hope to learn. But experience has shown that in order to gain true fluency in a language a student must learn to think in it. This point may sound trivial but it can have profound importance, as thoughts in one language may not have an adequate translation in another. And as we often see the world through the medium of the language we use, this shift can in fact change the way we experience the world . (21) Excluding "to be"-with its connotation of permanence, finality, and completeness - can bring one to experience the world more as a process, as a world that changes, rather than one defined by static ideas and permanent objects . (11) These days I habitually think in E-Prime, and although this took me years to achieve, I see the effort involved as trivial when I consider the value of the result .

### Perm

#### The alternative requires a commitment to each and every reduction of “to be” verbs

Kellogg & Bourland 91 [E.W. (Prof of Linguistics) & D. David (General Semantics), “Working with E-Prime: Some Practical Notes,” *Et Cetera,* p.389-90]

As a first step, concentrate on using E-Prime in unimportant notes or letters and in your personal diary. After you have gained some facility in writing, begin to use E-Prime for more serious work . Although it works best to have a goal of 100% E-Prime for your final version, expect to have a few "to be" sentences in the text in cases where the E-Prime version sounds overly awkward, etc. Count any reduction in the incidence of "to be" in your written work as an achievement in the right direction . With continued effort your expertise in writing in E-Prime will increase to the point where few, if any, readers will detect any abnormality of writing style : more than likely you will receive compliments on the clarity and improved quality of your finished work . By the time you have learned to write easily in E-Prime, you will probably already have begun to speak in it occasionally . However, if you really want to reap the full benefits of the discipline, you will have to make a serious commitment to speaking in E-Prime exclusively, because speaking in E-Prime will force you to learn how to think in E-Prime . Just as with learning a foreign language, a time comes when you begin to think in the language rather than to merely translate sentences into it, so with learning to speak in E-Prime. Unfortunately this process usually requires total immersion in the language and culture and a serious commitment on the student's part. As we do not live in an E-Prime culture, this makes your own personal commitment to speak in E-Prime doubly important. When first learning to speak in E-Prime, you may have to rehearse each sentence mentally before you say it . For a while people might find your conversation a trifle limited, but as many people like to hear themselves talk most of all, they probably will not notice your reticence . Nodding the head, looking intelligently interested and occasionally mouthing words and phrases such as "yes, or "perhaps;" "I agree;" "indeed, etc., will prove adequate for all but the rarest of conversations, where someone actually wants to talk with rather than at you. In such a case, if you take on an attitude of deep thought, even half-finished phrases and pidgin E-Prime may command respect! As mentioned earlier with respect to arguments, I have also found it valuable to practice translating the statements of others during conversations, and then feeding back the E-Prime statement to the original speaker. You will probably feel surprised at the difference this can make .

#### The perm fails – like with smoking, we can only overcome the addiction to “to be” language through discipline, not moderation.

Kellogg & Bourland 91 [E.W. (Prof of Linguistics) & D. David (General Semantics), “Working with E-Prime: Some Practical Notes,” *Et Cetera,* p.380-1]

In principle, if not in practice, we agree that in some instances one could use forms of "to be" (in its auxiliary, existence, and location modes) without causing appreciable "semantic damage ." Even so, most English teachers would agree that most of us overuse and misuse the verb, and that even a 75% reduction in its use would improve our writing and speaking skills . But why go to the extreme of trying to eliminate it totally? Because for better or worse, it looks as if only an all-or-nothing approach to this problem works successfully. De Morgan, Santayana, Korzybski, and many general semanticists warned against misuses of the verb such as the "is" of identity, yet they continued to misuse it themselves! We see the misuse and overuse of the verb "to be" by English speakers as a kind of linguistic addiction. It allows us to play God using the omniscient "Deity mode" of speech, as when we say, "That is the truth .' It allows even the most ignorant to transform their opinions magically into god-like pronouncements on the nature of things . Its overuse allows one to communicate sloppily without unduly taxing the brain by trying to come up with more appropriate verbs . Let's compare this linguistic "addiction" to one more mundane – cigarette smoking. Although reducing smoking from two packs to two cigarettes a day might reduce lung cancer to a level not significantly different from not smoking at all, no medical authority that we know of recommends this . And why? Because it rarely, if ever, works . Very few people can go from overuse to moderation in use-the temptation for old habits to reassert themselves proves just too strong . Although a less extreme form of E-Prime that allows for an occasional use of "is" would probably accomplish the same goals, we have yet to see anyone manage this . For those simply interested in writing only, a less drastic form of E-Prime (such as E-Prime mod) (15) might suffice. With word processing capabilities, one could easily edit and revise writing in accordance with non-Aristotelian and phenomenological principles, checking each individual usage of "to be" for possible misuses . Given the word processing technology available today (1990), self-proclaimed general semanticists no longer have any excuse for not ridding their prose of instances of the "is of identity" and the "is of predication" However, we ourselves have found it unnecessary to use the verb "to be" even in its more benign aspects - indeed, we have found that eliminating these usages has improved our writing style . Perhaps most importantly, I (E. K.) very much doubt whether I could have learned to comprehensively eliminate misuses of "to be" in my speaking, and finally in my thinking, without the simple, and easily understood discipline that pure E-Prime requires . The simplicity of the basic rule allows me to make changes in real time, while speaking or thinking.

# Case

## Presumption

### Turn - Adversarialism

#### The adversarial structure of debate turns aff solvency

Atchison and Panetta ‘9 [Jarrod Atchison, Director of Debate @ Trinity University, and Edward Panetta, Director of Debate @ the University of Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future, p. 317-34 //liam]

The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus **encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem**. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.¶ If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed.¶ From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

## Fungibility

#### The aff’s appropriation of the notion “fungibility” is built directly on and performs the fungibility of blackness. They attempt to describe their own exclusion through the language given meaning by the violent abjection of blackness. This is a ruse of analogy that is parasitic on gratuitous anti-black violence and the labor of countless debaters who gave the term “fungibility” meaning in debate. This renders the condition of antiblackness illegible.

Wilderson 10 [Frank, Assoc Prof of African American Studies at UC-Irvine, Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms, p.21-2]

The most salient feature of Dorsey's findings is not his understanding of the way Blackness, as a crucial and fungible conceptual possession of civil society, impacts and destabilizes previously accepted categories of intra-White thought. Most important, instead, is his contribution to the evidence that, even when Blackness is deployed to stretch the elasticity of civil society to the point of civil war, that expansion is never elastic enough to embrace the very Black who catalyzed the expansion. In fact, Dorsey, building on Bradley's historical research, asserts that just the opposite is true. The more the political imagination of civil society is enabled by the fungibility of the slave metaphor, the less legible the condition of the slave becomes: "Focusing primarily on colonial newspapers . . . Bradley finds that the slavery metaphor 'served to distance the patriot agenda from the antislavery movement.' If anything, Bradley states, widespread use of the metaphor 'gave first evidence that the issue of real slavery was not to have a part in the revolutionary messages.'"35 And Eltis believes that this philosophical incongruity between the image of the Slave and freedom for the Slave begins in Europe and predates the American Revolution by at least one hundred years: "The [European] countries least likely to enslave their own had the harshest and most sophisticated system of exploiting enslaved non-Europeans. Overall, the English and Dutch conception of the role of the individual in metropolitan society ensured the accelerated development of African chattel slavery in the Americas . . . because their own subjects could not become chattel slaves or even convicts for life."36 Furthermore, the circulation of Blackness as metaphor and image at the most politically volatile and progressive moments in history (e.g., the French, English, and American revolutions) produces dreams of liberation which are more inessential to and more parasitic on the Black, and more emphatic in their guarantee of Black suffering, than any dream of human liberation in any era heretofore.

We don’t need to pretend to be scholars of antiblackness or that our practice perfectly aligns with that. And you are making antiblackness fungible and pulling it out of context that you’re trying to use as offense against us within a totally different circumstance.

## Ballot

#### Presenting the 1AC’s value as dependent on the recognition of the critic reduces the revolutionary nature of the act—fails to produce meaningful change and draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy—vote Negative to decline affirmation

Phillips 99 – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses. Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism. Rhetorical resistance That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice. The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups. The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn. Resistance criticism Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63). Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center? (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative. (4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized. The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. Rhetorical criticism As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.

#### Ballot isn’t a remedy – if you are threatened by structural, material conditions mediating survival thru a judge is dangerous –

Berlant 11 (Lauren, prof at U Chicago, Cruel Optimism, 174-8)

So even if, in these two films, the promise of familial love is the convey­ ance for the incitement to misrecognize the bad life as a good one, this is also a story about the conditions under which fantasy takes the most conservative shape on the bottom of so many class structures. The adults want to pass the promise of the promise on to their children.14 That may be the children's only sure inheritance-fantasy as the only capital assuredly pass­ able from one contingent space to another. And of course here, as every­ where, the gendered division of labor mediates the attritions of capital and the intimate spaces in which the labor of living is imagined beyond the urgencies of necessity. As Gayatri Spivak writes of another example, "This is not the old particularism/universalism debate. It is the emergence of the generalized value form, global commensurability in the field of gender. All the diversity of daily life escapes this, yet it is inescapable." ts Rosetta and La Promesse are training differently gendered children to take up a position not within normative institutions of intimacy but within something proximate to them. The hypervigilance required to maintain this proximity is the main visceral scene of post-Fordist affect. The fantasy of intimacy that will make one feel normal (as opposed to making one able to secure the conditions of dependable reciprocal life) provides a false logic of commensurateness and continuity between everyday appearance and a whole set of abstract value­ generating relations. The aesthetic of the potentially good enough love enables crisis to feel ordinary and less of a threat than the affective bounty that makes it worth risking being amid capitalist social life. ¶ But in the Dardennes' mise en scene, normative intimacy has been worn down to the nub of the formal and the gestural. The emotions associated with intimacy, like tenderness, are most easily assumed as scavenging strate­ gies that the children are compelled to develop to get by. Igor acts genuinely sweet to the old woman whose wallet he steals in the opening scene; Rosetta ¶ [175]¶ acts in loving and protective ways toward her mother, whom she also beats for manifesting nonnormative appetites. Roger appeals to Igor for loyalty, although he has also lied to him, beat him, and destroyed his opportunity to be a kid and to cultivate a different life (also involving building things: but go-carts that move, not houses that require property). Yet Roger can still say, "The house, this whole thing, it's all for you!" To which Igor can only say, "Shut up! Shut up!" because there is no story to counter Roger with, no proof that it wasn't love, or that love was a bad idea. Apparently, the register of love is what there is to work with, when you are managing belonging to worlds that have no obligation to you. ¶ But this is why optimism for belonging in a scene ofp otential reciprocity amid tragic impediments is, in these films, not merely cruel, even in its repe­ titions. The endings of these films tie the audience in identificatory knots of vicarious reciprocity that extend in affective and formal ways beyond the actual episode. Rosetta approaches her final shots having just had to quit her hard-won job in order to take care of her degenerating mother. She is miser­ able and defeated by her daughterly love and her commitment to not living outside the loop of a reciprocity whose feeling feels legitimate to her. ¶ At the end, we see her dragging a big canister of gas. It is unclear whether she is about to commit suicide by asphyxiation, or to make a go of things the way she always does, and it doesn't matter: her body collapses in exhaus­ tion as Riquet arrives. Riquet-whom she has previously beaten up, left to drown, turned in as a thief, and had a strange, unsteady, asexual night with, a night that ends with her sleeping, not alone, but whispering intimately with herself.16 Riquet-who is stalking her in revenge for taking his job. He is the only resource for potential reciprocity she has. As the film closes, Rosetta weeps, looking off-screen toward he who is only a proximate friend, in the hope of stimulating his compassionate impulse to rescue her. And the film cuts to darkness. ¶ Likewise, the close of La Promesse involves a scene of wishful gallantry. In the train station, just as Assita is about to escape Belgium, Igor's father, Igor, and the whole shoddy mess, Igor confesses one part of his secret. Perversely fullfilling and breaking "the promise" after which the picture is named, he gambles that revealing Amidou's death will keep Assita there, and indeed it binds her and her child to him and to the local scene of danger, violence, and poverty for the indefinite future. In the final shot, they walk away from the camera, together and not together, and as they become smaller the film cuts sharply to black. Both of these works thus end engendering in the audience [176]a kind of normativity hangover, a residue of the optimism of their advocacy for achieving whatever it was for which the protagonists were scavenging. Because Rosetta and Igor are cut off from the normal, the spectators become holders of the promise. ¶ In classic Hollywood cinema and much of queer theory, such expectant "families we choose" endings would make these films, generically, come­ dies, and the anxieties we feel on the way would be just the effects of the conventional obstacles genres put out there that threaten the genre's fail­ ure.17 In Foucault's rendering, such scenes of communicative tears and confession would mark the children's ascension into sexuality, that is, into the place where desiring acts evince the youths' subjugation to the clarifying taxonomic machinery of familial and social discipline. In La Promesse and Rosetta it is where they become sexual, but such evocations of the two clari­ fying institutions of social intelligibility, genre and gender, would mishear the tonalities of these particular episodes. In these scenarios, sexuality is not only an accession to being intelligible, but also a performance of affective avarice, a demand for a feeling fix that would inject a sense of normality.¶ What does it mean to want a sense of something rather than something? In the emergent regime of privatization that provokes aggressive fantasies of affective social confirmation in proximity to the political often without being in its register, genre shifts can point to new ways of apprehending improvisations within the ordinary. In the Dardennes' films, the formal achievement of genre and gender suggests not success but survival, a survival reeking of something that partakes of the new generic hybrid, situation tragedy: the marriage between tragedy and situation comedy where people are fated to express their flaws episodically, over and over, without learning, changing, being relieved, becoming better, or dying.18 In the situation comedy, personality is figured as a limited set of repetitions that will inevitably [177] appear in new situations-but what makes them comic and not tragic is that in this genre's imaginary, the world has the kind of room for us that enables us to endure. In contrast, in the situation tragedy, one moves between having a little and being ejected from the social, where life is lived on the outside of value, in terrifying nonp laces where one is a squatter, trying to make an event in which one will matter to something or someone, even as a famil­ iar joke (in the situation tragedy, protagonists often try heart-wrenchingly to live as though they are in a situation comedy).19 In reinventing some ver­ sion of the couple, the family, or the love link, at the end, Rosetta and Igor are repeating a desire they have fancied and longed for throughout: a desire simply and minimally to be in the game. Not controlling the conditions of labor, they take up positions within sexuality that at least enable a feeling of vague normalcy that can be derived on the fly, in a do-it-yourself (DIY) fash­ ion. They do this in gestures that try to force a sense of obligation in someone, which will just have to stand in as the achievement of their desire for acknowledgment and a way of life. ¶ Thus, we see forming here submission to necessity in the guise of desire; a passionate attachment to a world in which they have no controlling share; and aggression, an insistence on being proximate to the thing. If these motives stand as the promise of the scene that will provide them that holding feeling they want, the proof that it's worth investing in these forms is not too demanding. There is a very low evidentiary bar. The key here is proximity; ownership has been relinquished as the children's fantasy. The geopolitical space of fantasy is not a nation or a plot of land secured by a deed but a neighborhood. And just as both films feature careers involving soldering and sewing, techniques that bind parts to bigger wholes, they restage at the close our protagonists' coercive appeal to a relative stranger for rescue and reciprocity, and all the stranger has to do is to be near, to stick around. [178]¶ That this is an appeal to a proximate normativity is signified by their spatial placement outside the home (in a terminal, on the ground) but never very far afield at all; they are all in proximity to the natal and fantasmatic home, in the end. And, affectively speaking, is Riquet not a man on whom the silent Rosetta must depend; and is Assita not a motherfsisterfloverffriend forced by Igor, by his sweet downcast eyes and aphonia, to submit? ¶ Normalcy's embrace can only flicker, therefore, in the Dardennes' ren­ dering of the contemporary historical moment. Each time it looks as though a reciprocal relation has been forged, the temporal and monetary economy in which the experience of belonging can be enjoyed is interrupted by other needs, the needs of others that seem always to take priority. Nonetheless, in the context of material and parental deprivation, Rosetta and Igor crowd the cramped space of any potentially transitional moment to maintain, for one more minute, their optimism about having a thing, a life, a scene of practices of belonging and dignity that can be iterated, repeated, and depended on without much being looked forward to. ¶ So, what does it mean that the endings of these films solicit audience desire one more time for the protagonists to receive, finally, the help they seek because it feels like their last chance to experience, through openness to another, a good change amid the violence and numbing everywhere present? Since "at all costs" is no metaphor from this perch on the bottom of the class structure, here fantasy and survival are indistinguishable effects of the affects' own informal economy. To be made to desire a normativity hangover trains the audience in cruel optimism.

# 1NR

### 2NC – Overview

### 2NC A2 Can’t Fiat Strikes/CP Can’t Spill Over

#### Must discuss methodologies before we can discuss our politics – anything else cedes the political to the far right and locks in a new wave of fascism.

Beswick 21 (1/9/21, Spencer Beswick AKA Empty Hands is a PhD history student at Cornell University and the founder of the Empty Hands History project/commune, they focus on the histories and strategies of the left in the United States, might call them the CEO of antifa, “Democracy, Whiteness, and Fascism: Reflections on the Jan. 6 Capitol-Storming”, <https://emptyhandshistory.com/democracy-whiteness-and-fascism-reflections-on-the-jan-6-capitol-storming/>, accessed 1/21/21, fhs-cm)

Initial Thoughts on Tactics Vs. Politics

I have seen a lot of people say that the far right storming the capitol is a terrible assault on democracy and its institutions. Many of these comments conflate condemnation of the tactic with condemnation of the politics of the demonstrators. But I’m not sure that this is a good read of the situation.

Many (most?) of these people in DC actually truly believe that the election was stolen and that democracy is dead (though many of them are indeed straight up fascist opportunists). The protestors are totally wrong in the specifics of their conspiracy theories (but perhaps correct that US democracy is largely a sham)… But isn’t it true that storming a capitol building in defense of democracy against a real coup would actually be a good thing? At least arguably?

Let’s say that Trump was a more effective fascist and he managed to throw out the results of the election and install himself as the Great Eternal Leader, with support of the DC police and the national guard as well as most of the elite political institutions that might otherwise act against him. Might it not be a good idea to storm the capitol to try to remove him?

I guess what I’m really trying to say is that I think the left has been totally outmaneuvered here. Somehow many people on the left (we could say many socialists/socdems/progressives, rather than anarchists and communists) find themselves defending the sanctity of US democracy as Biden and Co. prepare for four more years of the status quo, while the far right has managed to position itself as the more radical opposition in the streets. This sets a dangerous precedent.

This is in many ways a reversal of the politics and street norms of how things played out last year with the George Floyd rebellion. How did this happen? What can be done to build a more effective left in the coming years?

Note: I probably overemphasized the fascists’ belief that they were indeed “saving democracy.” What follows are further thoughts on how to interrogate their relationship with democracy.

Saving White Democracy — or Abolishing It

I’ve been thinking about how to evaluate the far-right Capitol-stormers’ claim that they were “saving democracy” from being “stolen.” On the face of it, it’s ridiculous. The QAnon conspiracy theories are dumb and the many known fascists and neo-nazis photographed in the heart of the action are quite likely using “saving democracy” as a cover for what they really want: white power. But I think it’s not this simple, or rather, it is more accurate to say that in many ways “democracy” has always been a cover for white power and white supremacy in this country.

These reactionary white people have a very different understanding of what democracy means than we do. For many white people in the US, “democracy” has always meant “white capitalist democracy.” We know how this worked historically.

White (male) democracy has from the beginning rested on systematic exclusion of BIPOC, poor people, and women. Democracy and citizenship were originally conceived as the domain of only white male property owners. Only certain people were considered “fit” for self-government, and Black people in particular were understood to be constitutively unfit for self-government. Their exclusion was part of the foundation of republicanism (not meaning the GOP), democracy, and whiteness in the US. I’ve been reading David Roediger’s The Wages of Whiteness and Joel Olson’s The Abolition of White Democracy, which have helped me contextualize the historical interweaving of whiteness, citizenship, and democracy.

But democracy has always been a contested category, and it has changed over the years as BIPOC and women have fought for and won the right to vote. They have not simply expanded the electorate, but indeed expanded the very notion of democracy itself. In order to understand the current “stop the steal” mobilization, we have to see that for a certain sector of fascists and white supremacists, these changes have always been illegitimate. In their minds, Black people in particular are not and cannot be fit for self-government. They are not democratic citizens. They are necessarily the excluded Other, so their participation threatens white democracy itself.

This is why, Joel Olson argues, we must abolish white democracy. We need to abolish whiteness as a social category that produces hierarchy and racial oppression, and we need to abolish the system of white democracy that defends whiteness and capitalism.

But I do believe in democracy. My vision of it is similar to that old vision of “participatory democracy” that they talked about in the 1960s. Democracy is an active practice in which people make decisions about the things that affect them. It is about self-government, true equality, and true freedom. It is incompatible with the vision of white democracy that these fascists support. It is also incompatible with the settler empire called the United States.

Final Thoughts on Fascism’s Growing Threat

To be clear, I think that the storming of the Capitol is a Very Bad and Scary Thing and that fascism is a large and growing threat that must be taken very seriously. But I do think the danger is probably more in the medium to long term rather than in the short term. This gives us time to prepare so that we won’t continue to be outmaneuvered by them.

Short term: they are not well organized. They clearly had no idea what they were going to do in the event that they actually got into the capitol building. Trump is largely ineffective. Most Republican officials have repudiated them. The majority of the government and the majority of the population clearly found the whole thing awful and I don’t see a real possibility of any kind of actual coup before Biden takes office.

Medium term: the far right gets to claim a major win and this will embolden them. We will very likely see a major escalation in both street violence and lone wolf violence coming from fascists (and as a friend pointed out, likely further actions on inauguration day and future coordinated actions at state Capitols). I would not be surprised if this also functions as the beginning of the consolidation of a more significant mass fascist party/organization/movement. Which brings me to…

Long term: think of this as analogous to Hitler’s failed Beer Hall Putsch in 1923. A couple thousand Nazis led a doomed insurrection, some of them were killed, Hitler ended up in prison for treason. This is when he wrote Mein Kampf. Although the putsch was a total failure, it was a very important moment in the development of the Nazis, and we know what happened ten years later. Is this the most likely direction that history now heads in? Probably not. But this is the danger: that fascists successfully use this experience to help build a militant mass movement.

This is why we must continue to vigorously oppose fascists at every turn. Biden won’t save us. The Democrats won’t save us. The State won’t save us. Only sustained organization and action will.

#### **The only productive way to get organized within debate is through performative revolutionary fiat**

The Invisible Committee 07 (The Invisible Committee is an anonymous French author; possibly authors, one could say a committee - also possibly terrorists - semiotext(e) intervention series 1, “The Coming Insurrection” – chapters 8/9: GET GOING / FIND EACH OTHER, pages 95-100, fhs-cm – bracketed for ableist language)

GET GOING!

We can no longer even see how an insurrection might begin. Sixty years of pacification and containment of historical upheavals, sixty years of democratic anesthesia and the management of events, have dulled our perception of the real, our sense of the war in progress. We need to start by recovering this perception.

It's useless to get indignant about openly unconstitutional laws such as Perben II. It's futile to legally protest the complete implosion of the legal framework. We have to get organized.

It's useless to get involved in this or that citizens' group, in this or that dead-end of the far left, or in the latest "community effort." Every organization that claims to contest the present order mimics the form, mores and language of miniature states. Thus far, every impulse to "do politics differently" has only contributed to the indefinite spread of the state's tentacles.

It's useless to react to the news of the day; instead we should understand each report as a maneuver in a hostile field of strategies to be decoded, operations designed to provoke a specific reaction. It's these operations themselves that should be taken as the real information contained in these pieces of news.

It's useless to wait-for a breakthrough, for the revolution, the nuclear apocalypse or a social movement. To go on waiting is madness. The catastrophe is not coming, it is here. We are already situated within the collapse of a civilization. It is within this reality that we must choose sides.

To no longer wait is, in one way or another, to enter into the logic of insurrection. It is once again to hear the slight but always present trembling of terror in the voices of our leaders. Because governing has never been anything other than postponing by a thousand subterfuges the moment when the crowd will string you up, and every act of government is nothing but a way of not losing control of the population.

We're setting out from a point of extreme isolation, of extreme weakness. An insurrectional process must be built from the ground up. Nothing appears less likely than an insurrection, but nothing is more necessary.

FIND EACH OTHER

Attach yourself to what you feel to be true. Begin there.

An encounter, a discovery, a vast wave of strikes, an earthquake: every event produces truth by changing our way of being in the world. Conversely, any observation that leaves us indifferent, doesn't affect us, doesn't commit us to anything, no longer deserves the name truth. There's a truth beneath every gesture, every practice, every relationship, and every situation. We usually just avoid it, manage it, which produces the ~~madness~~ [frustration] of so many in our era. In reality, everything involves everything else. The feeling that one is living a lie is still a truth. It is a matter of not letting it go, of starting from there. A truth isn't a view on the world but what binds us to it in an irreducible way. A truth isn't something we hold but something that carries us. It makes and unmakes me, constitutes and undoes me as an individual; it distances me from many and brings me closer to those who also experience it. An isolated being who holds fast to a truth will inevitably meet others like her. In fact, every insurrectional process starts from a truth that we refuse to give up. During the '80s in Hamburg, a few inhabitants of a squatted house decided that from then on they would only be evicted over their dead bodies. A neighborhood was besieged by tanks and helicopters, with days of street battles, huge demonstrations-and a mayor who, finally, capitulated. In 1940, Georges Guingouin, the "first French resistance fighter," started with nothing but the certainty of his refusal of the Nazi occupation. At that time, to the Communist Party, he was nothing but a "madman living in the woods," until there were 20,000 madmen living in the woods, and Limoges was liberated.

Don't back away from what is political in friendship.

We've been given a neutral idea of friendship, understood as a pure affection with no consequences. But all affinity is affinity within a common truth. Every encounter is an encounter within a common affirmation, even the affirmation of destruction. No bonds are innocent in an age when holding onto something and refusing to let go usually leads to unemployment, where you have to lie to work, and you have to keep on working in order to continue lying. People who swear by quantum physics and pursue its consequences in all domains are no less bound politically than comrades fighting against a multinational agribusiness. They will all be led, sooner or later, to defection and to combat.

The pioneers of the workers' movement were able to find each other in the workshop, then in the factory. They had the strike to show their numbers and unmask the scabs. They had the wage relation, pitting the party of capital against the party of labor, on which they could draw the lines of solidarity and of battle on a global scale. We have the whole of social space in which to find each other. We have everyday insubordination for showing our numbers and unmasking cowards. We have our hostility to this civilization for drawing lines of solidarity and of battle on a global scale.

Expect nothing from organizations.

Beware of all existing social milieus,

and above all don't become one.